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Abstract
In this paper we conduct descriptive aggregate analyses to revisit the relation between
low and lowest-low period fertility on the one, and cohort fertility and key fertility-
related behaviors—such as leaving the parental home, marriage and female labor force
participation—on the other side. First, we identify a systematic pattern of lowest-low
fertility that is characterized by a rapid delay of childbearing, a low progression prob-
ability after the ﬁrst child (but not particularly low levels of ﬁrst-birth childbearing),
and a “falling behind” in cohort fertility at relatively late ages. Second, our analyses
show that the cross-country correlations in Europe between the total fertility level on
the one side, and the total ﬁrst marriage rate, the proportion of extramarital births
and the female labor force participation rate on the other side have reversed during
the period from 1975 to 1999. At the end of the 1990s there is also no longer evidence
that divorce levels are negatively associated with fertility levels. Based on these anal-
yses we conclude that the emergence of lowest-low fertility during the 1990s has been
accompanied by a disruption or even a reversal of many well-known patterns that have
been used to explain cross-country diﬀerences in fertility patterns.
1 Introduction
The majority of the world’s population is expected to live in regions with near-replacement
or below-replacement fertility in less than 10 years, and the earlier distinct fertility regimes,
‘developed’ and ‘developing’, are increasingly disappearing in global comparisons of fertil-
ity levels (Bongaarts and Bulatao 2000; Lutz et al. 2001; Wilson 2001). Several aspects of
this convergence towards low fertility are particularly striking in this context. First, the
spread of below-replacement fertility to formerly high fertility countries has occurred at
a remarkably rapid pace and implied a global convergence of fertility indicators that has
been quicker than the convergence of many other socioeconomic characteristics. Second,
earlier notions that fertility levels may naturally stabilize close to replacement level have
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been shattered. In the early 1990s, for instance, Italy and Spain attained lowest-low fertil-
ity levels, deﬁned as a TFR below 1.3, and at the end of the 1990s there were 14 lowest-low
fertility countries in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe (Kohler et al. 2002). Third,
recent fertility trends in developed countries have been accompanied by a remarkable di-
vergence in the fertility levels, ranging in the late 1990s from lowest-low fertility to TFR
levels close to 2.1 in the United States.
The new aspect of current low and lowest-low fertility patterns is that the postpone-
ment of childbearing—particularly for ﬁrst births—has emerged as a crucial determinant
of diﬀerences in fertility levels among developed countries. The reasons for this rapid
delay of childbearing in many developed countries seem to be twofold. First, several fac-
tors make late childbearing a rational response to socioeconomic changes. These factors
include increased incentives to invest in higher education and labor market experience,
uncertainty in early adulthood (for instance, due to high youth unemployment of up to 40
percent for women in Southern European countries during the 1990s), general economic
uncertainty in Central and Eastern European transition countries, and ineﬃcient hous-
ing markets leading to high costs of establishing or expanding independent households.
Kohler et al. (2002) argue, however, that these incentives are not suﬃcient to under-
stand the dynamics of fertility postponement. In addition, social interaction eﬀects are
likely to reinforce individual desires to delay childbearing in response to socioeconomic
changes in low and lowest-low fertility countries. These interaction eﬀects occur due to
social learning and social inﬂuence in the decision processes about the timing of fertility
(Kohler 2001; Kohler et al. 2001; Montgomery and Casterline 1996), and they can also be
caused by feedbacks in the labor and marriage market that make late fertility individually
more rational the later the population age-pattern of fertility is. As a consequence of
these interaction eﬀects, Kohler et al. (2002) argue that the delay of childbearing follows
a postponement transition that shares many characteristics with the fertility transition in
Europe or contemporary developing countries. As a consequence of the still ongoing post-
ponement transition, the extent to which speciﬁc socioeconomic and institutional contexts
accommodate late childbearing has emerged as an essential determinant of cross-country
variation in fertility levels in developed countries.
In this paper we therefore conduct a series of descriptive aggregate analyses to revisit
the relation between low and lowest-low period fertility on the one, and cohort fertility and
key fertility-related behaviors—such as leaving the parental home, marriage and female
labor force participation—on the other side. These analyses can improve our understand-
ing of the demographic, socioeconomic and institutional context that is associated with
the emergence—or non-emergence—of lowest-low fertility in European countries, and it
characterizes the basic demographic and socioeconomic patterns that are associated with
low and lowest-low fertility in contemporary Europe.
2 Period Fertility Trends in Lowest-Low Fertility Countries
We begin our analyses with an investigation of period and cohort fertility trends in lowest-
low fertility countries. For simplicity, we focus these analyses on a subset of countries that3
represent the key lowest-low fertility patterns. In particular, most of our analyses include
Italy and Spain, which are the forerunners of lowest-low fertility, the Czech Republic
and Hungary, which are Central European countries that exhibit a rapid postponement
of fertility during the 1990s, and Bulgaria that represents a transition country with a
severe economic crisis in the 1990s and only modest delays of childbearing in the last
decade. For comparison, we also include a country that was among the forerunners of the
Second Demographic Transition and the initial emergence of below-replacement fertility
(Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; van de Kaa 1987): the Netherlands.
Figure 1 depicts the period total fertility rate and the period mean age at ﬁrst birth in
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands. Because small
diﬀerences in TFR levels become increasingly relevant in low fertility situations, we rescale
the TFR-axis in this and all subsequent ﬁgures so that TFR distances are proportional to
diﬀerences in stable population growth rates in the stable population.1
In 1960, none of these countries in Figure 1a exhibited a total fertility rate of below
2.0, and the three countries with highest TFR levels were the Netherlands, Spain and
Italy respectively. The total fertility rate initially declined in the Netherlands, and in the
second half of the 1970s the Dutch TFR was the lowest among the countries included in
Figure 1. Italy and Spain were the next countries that experienced a rapid and marked
fertility decline, and at ﬁrst this decline seemed to follow the pattern of the Netherlands
or other forerunners of the Second Demographic Transition. In the 1980s, however, an
important divergence occurs between the Netherlands on the one hand and Italy and Spain
on the other: the Dutch total fertility rate stabilized and reversed after reaching a trough
of 1.47 in 1983, in the late 1990s the total fertility increased again to 1.65. In contrast, the
Italian and Spanish TFRs continued to decline without such a stabilization at moderate
below-replacement levels. In the late 1980s, the Italian and Spanish total fertility rates
dropped below the Dutch TFR, and in 1990 Italy and Spain exhibit the lowest fertility
rate in Figure 1 by a substantial margin.
After Italy and Spain, lowest-low fertility spread to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
where the political and economic transition after 1990 has been associated with substantial
economic hardship and uncertainty (e.g., Kohler and Kohler 2002; Kohlmann and Zuev
2001; Philipov 2001) and marked demographic changes (e.g., Cornia and Panicci` a 2000;
Ku˘ cera et al. 2000). Representative for this experience of Central and Eastern European
countries, we depict in Figure 1 the total fertility of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and
Hungary. The ﬁgure shows that after some turbulences and marked changes prior to
1980s, frequently related to adjustments of family policies (e.g., Frejka 1980), the total
fertility rate in these countries has been relatively stable. In the early 1990s, however,
a major break occurs, and TFR levels rapidly decline to unprecedented low levels. This
drop in fertility rates has been very pronounced and swift, and many Central and Eastern
European countries—including Hungary, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria in Figure 1—
attained lowest-low fertility during the mid to late 1990s.
1These calculations are based on a mean age at birth of 30 years, which is a roughly representative
mean age for contemporary Western European countries, and a proportion of girls among all births of
.4886.4
Figure 1: Period total fertility rate and period mean age at ﬁrst birth in Bulgaria, the

































































Note: In this and all subsequent ﬁgures, the TFR axis has been rescaled so that TFR
distances are proportional to diﬀerences in stable population growth rates in the stable
population. These calculations are based on a mean age at birth of 30 years, which is
a roughly representative mean age for contemporary Western European countries, and a
proportion of girls among all births of .4886.5
The emergence of lowest-low fertility in Europe during the 1990s has been associated
with a substantial delay of childbearing in most countries, and the countries in Figure 1
are no exception. During the 1990s, for instance, the mean age at ﬁrst birth increased
by more than 1.5 years in Italy, Spain, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The change is
even more pronounced since the early 1980s: the increase in the mean age at ﬁrst birth
exceeds 3.5 years in Italy and Spain and 2.2 years in Hungary and the Czech Republic
(Council of Europe 2001). At the same time, it is important to note two deviations from
this nexus between lowest-low fertility and substantial delays in childbearing. On the one
hand, a rapid and marked postponement does not necessarily imply lowest-low fertility:
the Netherlands—along with other Nordic countries not analyzed here—have experienced
a comparable increase in the period mean age at ﬁrst birth during the 1980s and 1990s,
but this postponement has not been associated with substantial declines in period fertility
levels (Figure 1b). On the other hand, lowest-low fertility is also not inevitably associated
with a rapid delay of childbearing. For instance, the postponement in Bulgaria during the
1990s lags behind that of the remaining countries in Figure 1(b), and the mean age at
ﬁrst birth increased by only .8 years during the transition period in the 1990s. Bulgaria
therefore attained lowest-low fertility levels without substantial delays in the timing of ﬁrst
births, and this pattern is shared by Russia and other several formerly Soviet Republics
(see Kohler and Kohler 2002).
A further divergence between the lowest-low fertility countries in Figure 1 occurs with
respect to the onset of fertility postponement and the total delay of childbearing that has
already occurred. In particular, Italy and Spain have experienced an increasing mean age
at ﬁrst birth since the mid- to late 1970s, and in combination with a relatively high mean
age at ﬁrst birth at the onset, these countries have attained among the latest patterns of
childbearing in Europe. In contrast to these Southern European countries, the postpone-
ment of childbearing in the Central and Eastern European countries is still a relatively
recent phenomenon that represents a break with a prolonged period of early fertility and
marriage (see Hajnal 1965 for an early, and Coleman 1996 for a more recent discussion).
This Eastern European pattern can be further distinguished with respect to the onset
of fertility postponement. On the one hand, Hungary started its delay of ﬁrst births in
the 1980s and the 1990s are merely associated with a faster pace of an already ongoing
postponement process. The delay of parenthood in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, on
the other hand, is only initiated with the transition process in the early 1990s. It then
occurs at a very rapid pace in the Czech Republic, leading to a convergence in the mean
age at ﬁrst birth with Hungary, and it proceeds at a much more modest speed in Bulgaria,
which continues to exhibit the lowest mean age at ﬁrst birth in Figure 1(b) also at the
end of the 1990s.
3 Cohort Fertility Trends in Lowest-Low Fertility Countries
An essential issue in the context of lowest-low fertility is the question of how periods with
TFR levels below 1.3 aﬀect cohort fertility. On the one hand, the eﬀect is modest if
lowest-low fertility is only temporary and births are merely postponed but not foregone.6
Figure 2: Completed cohort fertility in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy,
Spain and the Netherlands
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Note: Cohort fertility has been rescaled so that distances are proportional to diﬀerences in
stable population growth rates in the stable population; see notes to Figure 1 for discussion.
Source for data: (Council of Europe 2001).
On the other hand, the implications of lowest-low TFR levels on cohort fertility are severe
if lowest-low fertility persists and if it is caused by reductions in completed fertility levels
instead of changes in the timing of fertility.
In this section, we study patterns of cohort fertility as far as they have been revealed
until the 1990s.2 We begin our investigations with the trends in completed cohort fertility,
and Figure 2 shows that the diﬀerences and divergences in period TFR trends, on which we
focused in the previous section, have their counterparts in cohort fertility patterns. First,
cohort fertility in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria have been relatively stable:
across all cohorts born between 1935 and 1962, completed cohort fertility in these three
countries remained within the interval ranging from 1.87 and 2.13 children, and there have
been no marked downward or upwards trends—with the potential exception of Hungary,
where cohort fertility increased starting for women born after 1955 due to pronatalistic
family policies. The interpretation of these stable cohort fertility levels, however, evolves
over time due to the shift in the relative position of these countries within Figure 2 (and
also within European countries more generally). While fertility levels in Hungary, the
Czech Republic and Bulgaria were the lowest for cohorts born prior to the end of WWII,
these Central European countries exhibit the highest level of fertility for cohorts born
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This reversal is due to the substantial declines of
cohort fertility in the other countries. For instance, Dutch fertility declined markedly in
all cohorts born after 1935 from a level of almost 2.5, and then stabilized at a level around
1.9 for cohorts born after 1950. Substantial declines in cohort fertility have also occurred
in Italy and especially Spain, but there has been no stabilization until the early 1960s.
2The data on completed cohort fertility is taken from Council of Europe (2001). The age-pattern of
cohort fertility for the more detailed analyses have been obtained from the Observatoire D´ emographique
Europ´ een for Italy, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, and comparable data for the Netherlands
has been provided by Evert van Imhoﬀ at the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI).
The data include age- and parity speciﬁc childbearing intensities (rates of the ﬁrst kind) and fertility rates
(rates of the second kind) for cohorts born from approximately the 1930s onward.7
As a consequence, for women born after 1949, Italian cohort fertility represents the lowest
level among all countries in Figure 2; it is only followed by Spain, where cohort fertility
has been declining more recently, but at a faster pace and to a larger extent than in Italy.
The above analyses of completed cohort fertility are no longer feasible for women born
from the early 1960 onwards because these women have not yet completed childbearing
as of 1999. An alternative in this situation is to study cumulated fertility, that is, the
number of children that have been born to women at various ages up to the most recent
calendar year. In order to provide a context and reference for these analyses, this study
of cumulated fertility is often conducted relative to a reference cohort (e.g., Frejka and
Calot 2001a,b,c). In this case, instead of being based on the absolute level of fertility,
the analyses focus on the diﬀerences between the cumulated fertility of women born in a
calendar year and the number of children that have been born to women in the reference
cohort. Figure 3, for instance, depicts the diﬀerence in the cumulated cohort fertility,
separately for ﬁrst births and all birth orders combined, between women born 1955–1975
and women in the reference cohort born in 1950. For Italy, these analyses reveal the
following cohort fertility pattern: At age 30, for example, women in the Italian cohort
born in 1965 had on average .22 fewer ﬁrst children and .54 fewer children in total as
the cohort born in 1950. This diﬀerence in fertility level to the reference cohort increases
for younger women. At age 25, for instance, Italian women born in 1970 had .33 fewer
ﬁrst and .54 fewer total children than the 1950 cohort, and it is likely that this diﬀerence
further widens as the cohort reaches its late twenties.
The graphs in Figure 3 also reveal the extent to which diﬀerences in fertility levels
across cohorts are due to a postponement of fertility. The Italian cohort born in 1960,
for example, ‘lagged’ behind the 1950 reference cohort and had on average about .15
fewer ﬁrst births at age 26. When the age of this cohort reached the late twenties and
early thirties, however, this gap was reduced and fertility for ﬁrst births was partially
recuperated. At age 35 it had only .067 fewer ﬁrst children than the reference cohort,
while the diﬀerence in overall fertility declined only slightly from .32 at age 29 to .26 at
age 35. Recuperation of postponed births, therefore, reveals itself in Figure 3 by a U-
shaped pattern: the line representing the cumulated fertility of a cohort initially declines
as the diﬀerence to the reference cohort grows, then reaches a trough, and reverses and
moves towards zero as the diﬀerence to the reference cohort diminishes. If there is ‘perfect’
recuperation, the diﬀerence will diminish completely, and partial recuperation implies a
persistent diﬀerence also at the end of childbearing ages. The Italian cohort born in 1955
reﬂects such partial recuperation as compared to the 1950 reference cohort, and a similar
pattern is likely to prevail in the 1960 and younger cohorts (for further discussions, see
Frejka and Calot 2001a).
The pattern for the Czech Republic in Figure 3 diﬀers from the Italian one due to the
relatively stable cohort fertility prior to the early 1960s. For instance, the cohorts born
1955–70 exhibit slightly higher fertility than the 1950 reference cohort at relatively young
ages, and they ‘fall behind’ the reference cohort only at ages from the mid to late twenties
onwards. For the 1955–60 cohorts the ultimate fertility diﬀerence at age 40 is very small,




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Cohort fertility by age in Dutch cohorts: the graphs depict the diﬀerence in the
cumulated fertility of cohorts born 1955, 1960,...,1975 and the reference cohort
born in 1950
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we consider cohorts that have experienced a substantial part of their reproductive ages
during the transition period in the 1990s. For instance, women in the 1970 cohort have
on average .47 fewer than the 1950 cohort at age 28, and the level of ﬁrst birth fertility
in the 1975 cohort at age 23 is by more than .33 below that of the 1950 cohort. This gap
is even more pronounced for completed fertility, where the 1970 cohort exhibits a fertility
level at age 23 that is .55 children below that of the reference cohort.
A common pattern for Italy and the Czech Republic in Figure 3 is the gradually
increasingdiﬀerenceincumulatedfertilitytothereferencecohortinearlyadulthood,where
unionformationandﬁrst-birthchildbearinghastraditionallybeenconcentrated. Thesame
situation also prevails in Hungary and Bulgaria (see Appendix Figure A 1, and in several
other European countries (Frejka and Calot 2001a,b,c). Frejka and Calot (2001a) have
denoted this diﬀerence in cumulated fertility to the reference cohort as a fertility deﬁcit,
and they have taken the increasing deﬁcit during early adulthood in younger cohorts as
an indication that cohort fertility in Italy and several other countries is likely to remain
substantially below that of the 1950 cohorts.3
While we do not necessarily disagree with this conclusion about further declines in
completed cohort fertility, the usefulness of this ﬁnding for assessing lowest-low fertility
is limited. In particular, as with many comparisons, the conclusion hinges critically on
the choice of the reference cohort. In addition, the above comparisons do not reveal the
fact that there are substantial diﬀerences in the timing of fertility and its recuperation
across diﬀerent countries, and the analyses do also not reveal the extent to which delays
in childbearing have been associated with trends towards low and lowest-low fertility.
As a counter-example to the Italian and Czech patterns, we therefore present in Fig-
ure 4 the cohort fertility trends in the Netherlands, which have been characterized by
substantial delays in childbearing without marked declines in cohort fertility levels. Thus,
3The notion of fertility deﬁcit, and its counterpart, fertility surplus is also somewhat unfortunate since it
tends to imply that the reference cohort reﬂects a “correct” or “desirable” fertility pattern, and deviations
from this pattern in younger cohorts constitute either surpluses or deﬁcits that are positively or negatively
evaluated by demographers.10
while younger cohorts in Figure 4 exhibit a growing ‘fertility deﬁcit’ during early adult-
hood, there is a successful recuperation of delayed births. In particular, the diﬀerence in
cumulated fertility to the 1950 reference cohort attains a maximum at ages in the late
twenties for cohorts born during 1955–70, and it then declines as these cohorts age and
enter their thirties. Moreover, the diﬀerence almost diminishes for women born in 1955
and 1960. Whether the same holds for the 1965 cohorts is diﬃcult to assess on the basis
of our present analyses, but Figure 4 clearly indicates that the diﬀerence is going to lessen
also for the 1965 cohort before it ends its childbearing years.
In order to understand the implications of delayed childbearing on cohort fertility, the
Netherlands may therefore serve as a ‘role model’ for lowest-low fertility countries: women
in the Netherlands delayed the onset of childbearing to very late ages in comparison with
other European countries, but this postponement occurred without substantially reducing
the quantum of fertility, or equivalently, the number of children born during the life-course.
A comparison of cohort fertility patterns in lowest-low fertility countries with the Dutch
cohort patterns may therefore be very illuminating, and we replicate our earlier analyses
using the Dutch cohort fertility pattern as reference (Figure 5). In particular, instead of
measuring the diﬀerence in cumulated fertility to the 1950 cohort, we present in Figure 5
the diﬀerence in the cumulated cohort fertility between Italian or Czech cohorts and Dutch
cohorts born in the same year. That is, the fertility pattern of the 1960 cohort in Italy is
compared to the 1960 cohort in the Netherlands, the 1965 Italian cohort is compared to
the 1965 Dutch cohort, and so forth.
While our earlier analyses indicated growing fertility deﬁcits in younger cohorts in Italy
and the Czech Republic, our investigations in Figure 5 provide a striking contrast: all co-
horts born during 1950–75 in Italy and the Czech Republic exhibit a higher cumulated
fertility in early adulthood than the corresponding Dutch cohorts born in the same year
(the same pattern also holds for Hungary and Bulgaria; see Appendix Figure A 2).4 The
analyses in Figure 5 therefore suggest that lowest-low fertility is not necessarily related
to the fact that fertility rates in early adulthood, or until the mid twenties, are particu-
larly low—quite on the contrary: some key lowest-low fertility countries such as Italy, the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Bulgaria exhibit a higher cohort fertility during the early
adulthood than cohorts in the Netherlands born in the same year. This is particularly
important since the Netherlands are characterized by relatively high period and cohort
fertility rates in a European comparison in the late 1990s, and the Netherlands are some-
times portrayed as a ‘success story’ with respect to adjusting to demographic challenges
provided by the fertility patterns of the 1990s (e.g., Lesthaeghe 2001; van Imhoﬀ 2001).
The ‘fertility surplus’ of lowest-low fertility countries during early adulthood is par-
ticularly large in the Czech Republic and other CEE countries that are still characterized
by a relatively young pattern of childbearing. For instance, the surplus exceeds .4 ﬁrst
children and .6 total children at age 25 for cohorts born prior to 1975, and it has markedly
declined only in the most recent cohort born in 1970. Despite this recent decline, the
4Kreyenfeld (2002) has also found a similar pattern in companions of East and West German cohort
fertility patterns, where young East German cohort tend to have more children as their West German
counterparts, despite the fact that the East German total fertility rate has been substantially lower than






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































comparison between the Czech and Dutch cohort patterns suggests that fertility even in
young Czech cohorts may not decline below the levels observed in the Netherlands. More-
over, the ‘surplus’ in early adulthood even opens the possibility that cohort fertility in
the Czech Republic—and other CEE countries—remains above that of many Western Eu-
ropean countries for the foreseeable future if period fertility trends stabilize or reverse.
Whether lowest-low fertility in CEE countries therefore implies lowest-low cohort fertility
is very questionable, and it depends to a substantial extent on the future trends in period
fertility.
In comparison to this Czech pattern, the Italian ‘fertility surplus’ in Figure 5 is more
modest and reaches a maximum of only .19 for ﬁrst births and .28 for all birth orders
combined around age 25. Despite the less remarkable fertility diﬀerence in comparison to
the Netherlands, a more detailed look at the Italian pattern is revealing with respect to the
determinants of lowest-low fertility. In particular, the diﬀerence in Figure 5(a) is positive
for all cohorts across all ages at which cohorts are observed, suggesting that all Italian
cohorts born during 1950–75 seem to be ahead of the corresponding Dutch cohorts in
terms of ﬁrst birth childbearing. The emergence of lowest-low fertility in Italy, therefore,
does not seem to be due to the fact that Italian cohorts have their ﬁrst children at a
particularly slow rate—on the contrary, Italian women in young cohorts born up to 1975
have more ﬁrst children than Dutch women in the same cohorts, despite the fact that the
total fertility rate in the Netherlands exceeds that of Italy by 35–40% in the late 1990s.
This fertility surplus also prevails at young ages when all birth orders are combined.
Italian cohorts have more children than their Dutch counterparts in their early twenties,
Italian cohorts born up to 1965 even had more children than the respective Dutch women
until they reached age 30. An important reversal, however, occurs around age 30, and
Italian cohorts fall behind the corresponding cohorts in the Netherlands in terms of cu-
mulated fertility. For the cohort born in 1950 this reversal is very modest, and Italian
women have only about .06 children less than their Dutch cohort-mates. The diﬀerence,
however, increases in younger cohorts. For instance, the Italian cohort born in 1960 has
.15 fewer children at age 35 than the respective Dutch cohort, and it seems likely that the
gap increases further for women born in 1965.
On a cohort level, therefore, the Italian lowest-low fertility pattern is not characterized
by few ﬁrst births or a particularly low fertility in early adulthood. Quite on the contrary,
Italian cohorts tend to be ahead of their Dutch cohort mates in terms of ﬁrst births and
overall fertility level until they reach their mid 20s (cohort 1970) or even late twenties and
early thirties (cohorts born up to 1965). The Italian lowest-low fertility pattern, however,
is characterized by a ‘falling behind’ later in the life-course when the progression to births
of higher parities becomes increasingly relevant.
4 Fertility-Related Patterns of Household and Union Dy-
namics
The patterns of lowest-low fertility described in the previous section are closely related
to cross-country diﬀerences in the processes of union formation and dissolution to which13
we turn our attention in the present section. This investigation of union formation and
dissolution is motivated by the fact that earlier analyses of the transition from high to low
fertility focused to a large extent on the decline of marital fertility. In particular, since
fertility before and during the ﬁrst demographic transition was almost totally realized
within marital unions, the timing and prevalence of marriage was seen as one of the
key mediating factors, or proximate determinants, that aﬀected fertility levels (Bongaarts
1978). After the emergence of low fertility, and especially in forerunners of the Second
Demographic Transition like Sweden and partially also the Netherlands, marriage has lost
its central role in being a precondition to childbearing. Nevertheless, in most European
countries besides the United Kingdom, almost the totality of births take place within
a co-resident partnership (either cohabiting or married), and the rise of extra-marital
childbearing is mostly due to the diﬀusion of cohabitation (Kiernan 1999).
In order to provide a conceptual framework for these changes in union formation and
dissolution, we adopt in our analyses the perspective of life-course transitions and life-
course decision-making. In this framework the decision to become a parent is embedded
in a process that involves several transitions in early adulthood that ultimately lead to
the separation from the parental home to entry into a union and entry into parenthood
(Modell et al. 1976). The central transitions in early adulthood, which also receive the
largest attention in life-course studies, are therefore the formation of a separate household
from one’s parents (leaving the parental home), the formation of an union with a partner
(union formation), and the transition to the ﬁrst child. We consider these two transitions
in turn.
4.1 Leaving the Parental Home: Latest-Late and Lowest-Low?
Leaving home is one of the crucial nodes of the life-course and a central event in early
adulthood. First, it generally implies the formation of a new household and greater auton-
omy for young people in all aspects of social life and personal decision-making, including
also many fertility-related decisions. Second, and most important for our context, child-
bearing in developed countries almost invariably takes place after young adults have left
their parental home, and home-leaving constitutes a central correlate of fertility and union
formation in Europe and other industrialized countries.
Patterns of home-leaving are therefore an important aspect of understanding contem-
porary fertility diﬀerences and trends, including also the emergence of lowest-low fertility
during the 1990s. In a pioneering study, Kiernan (1986) investigates home-leaving in six
Western European countries in 1982. The study identiﬁes Denmark as the country with
the earliest home-leaving, followed by West Germany, France, the Netherlands, Ireland
and the UK. In a follow-up investigation, Fern´ andez Cord´ on (1997) examined the living
arrangements of young adults over time in Spain, Greece, Italy, France, Germany and
the UK between 1986 and 1994. These longitudinal analyses revealed that Italy had the
highest share of young people co-residing with their parents during early adulthood, while
the UK had the smallest share. Moreover, the cohort trend towards delayed childbearing
has its counterpart in the timing of home-leaving, and Corijn (1999) found that cohorts in
most European countries born around 1950 and 1960 were postponing the transition out of14
Figure 6: Relationship between median age at leaving home and TFR (women)

















































Note: The ‘£’ mark gives the exact position of a country, while the area of circle is
proportional to the country’s population size in 1990. Sources for data: Billari et al.
(2001); Council of Europe (2001)
the parental home. This common trend towards delayed home-leaving, however, co-exists
with substantial variation in the timing of this event across countries. In particular, Corijn
(1999) ﬁnds that Italy and Spain are among the countries with a late separation from the
parental home, while Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden were among the countries with
an early pattern.
Despite this overall heterogeneity in patterns of homeleaving, however, there is an
important regularity with respect to the relation of homeleaving and lowest-low fertility.
In particular, the timing of home-leaving is quite homogeneously concentrated at relatively
late ages among lowest-low fertility countries. On the one hand, Italy, which is the ﬁrst
country experiencing lowest-low fertility in the early nineties, has the highest age both for
men and for women with 26.7 years and 23.6 years respectively. Some Central and Eastern
European countries, including those with lowest-low fertility, are not distant from the
latest-late pattern of Southern European countries. On the other hand, Sweden represents
the opposite side of the ranking with 20.2 years for men and 18.6 for women, resulting in
a diﬀerence of more than 6.5 years (males) and 5 years (females) in the timing of home-
leaving across European countries (for further analyses, see Billari et al. 2001).5 This
association between late homeleaving and low fertility persists in a cohort perspective.
Figure 6, for instance, compares the median age at home-leaving for the cohort born in
1960 with the completed fertility levels (CTFR), and the ﬁgure reveals a clear negative
association between median age at home-leaving and total fertility. On the one hand, all
countries with very late—or latest-late—homeleaving in Figure 6 are also exhibit lowest-
low fertility; on the other hand, not all lowest-low fertility countries are characterized
by late home-leaving, and there is considerable heterogeneity in completed fertility among
countries with earlier separation from the parental home. (In order to indicate the relevance
of data points in Figure 6 and subsequent ﬁgures, the data points are surrounded by circles
5The analyses are based on family and fertility surveys (FFS) that were conducted in many European
countries during the early 1990s; see (Billari et al. 2001) for details. For Bulgaria, the data unfortunately
are not available.15
that have an area proportional to a country’s population size in 1990).
4.2 Fertility and Marriage: A Shifting Relationship?
While home-leaving of young adults leads to the formation of a separate household, this
event is event is no longer closely tied in all societies to marriage and childbearing. Quite
on the contrary, we present in this section evidence that the relation between marriage
and fertility has been fundamentally transformed in recent decades.
In a well-known study, Hajnal (1965) traces an East-West divide in historical family
systems in Europe, and the so-called Hajnal line connects the cities of Trieste in North-
Eastern Italy and St. Petersburg in Western Russia. To the West of this line, the family
formation pattern is dominated by a neo-local nuclear family with relatively late marriage
and a signiﬁcant proportion of individuals who never marry. To the east of Hajnal’s line,
marriage has been early and universal, and the family is often extended. This divergence of
marriage pattern along Hajnal’s like also prevails after WWII and persists until the present
time. It is particularly pronounced between Central and Eastern Europe on the one and
Southern Europe on the other side Monnier and Rychtarikova (1992), while countries
to the west of Hajnal’s line reveal greater heterogeneity and diversity in contemporary
marriage behaviors that do not easily cluster into a single pattern (Reher 1998).
Even if historical patterns are an important aspect shaping present marriage behav-
iors and family organizations, the emergence of lowest-low fertility is associated with an
important shift of the relationship between marriage and fertility between the mid 1970s
and the end of the 1990s. In particular, it has traditionally been argued that cumulated
fertility is inversely related to age at marriage, and variations in the age at marriage
have often been an important explanatory factor of aggregate fertility diﬀerences across
countries. For instance, a linear relationship between TFR and age at ﬁrst marriage has
shown surprisingly good approximation (Henry 1976; Inaba 1996), and Billari et al. (2000)
estimate that a one-year increase in the age at marriage would bring down the number of
female children ever born by about 0.08 in Italian cohorts born around 1950.
In contrast to this positive association between marriage and fertility, the recent emer-
gence of lowest-low fertility, especially in Southern Europe, is associated with a situation
in which long-term partnership commitments—symbolized by a legal marriage and low
divorce rates—apparently represent an obstacle for the progression to (relatively) high
fertility levels. To illustrate this association, we compare on the left-hand side of Figure 7
the period total fertility rate (TFR) with the the period total ﬁrst marriage rate (TFMR).6
In 1975, Figure 7a shows that marriage and fertility were still closely intertwined and there
has been a positive correlation between the TFR and the total ﬁrst marriage rate. This
picture radically changes at the end of the 1990s. In particularly, after lowest-low fertil-
ity has emerged, the positive correlation between TFR and TFMR is much weaker, and
countries with high fertility levels also exhibit low marriage propensity (Figure 7c). A
similarly shifting relation occurs also with respect to fertility and divorce (Figure 7b,d).
In 1975, a higher level of divorce in European countries was associated with lower levels of
6A caveat of the total ﬁrst marriage rate (TFMR) is that it is subject to the same limitations and


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8: Proportion of extra-marital births and TFR, 1975 and 1999
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Note: TDR for Spain is for 1995. The ‘£’ mark gives the exact position of a country,
while the area of circle is proportional to the country’s population size in 1990. Source for
data: Council of Europe (2001)
fertility in cross-sectional comparisons, and the period total divorce rate (TDR), and the
TDR exhibits a negative correlation with the TFR (Figure 7b). This correlation becomes
weak in 1999, and if a systematic relationship exists at all between the TDR and the
TFR in 1999, the sign of the correlation has reversed: countries with higher TDR do also
have higher fertility levels (Figure 7d). In Figure 8 we additionally illustrate that the
relationship between the extent of out-of-wedlock childbearing and the level of fertility
has reversed along with the shifting centrality of marriage. In particular, a cross-sectional
comparison on European countries in 1975 reveals a positive correlation between the level
of extra-marital fertility and the total fertility rate. In 1999, this correlation has become
negative, and along with this reversal, the Southern European countries, Italy and Spain,
stand out as combining both lowest-low fertility and the lowest prevalence of non-marital
fertility.
In summary, the above analyses reinforce our argument that the emergence of lowest-
low fertility during the 1990s has been associated with fundamental shifts in the relation-
ships between fertility and marriage. In particular, there has been an increasing discon-
nection between marriage patterns and fertility levels after the emergence of lowest-low
fertility in the 1990s in cross-sectional analyses of European countries, and marriage for-
mation and dissolution are no longer important predictors of national fertility levels in18
Table 1: The timing of life-course transitions in early adulthood and completed fertility
for cohorts centered on 1960 in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Spain,
and The Netherlands.
Median age at
leaving ﬁrst ﬁrst 1960
home union marriage CTFR
Bulgaria n.a. 21.1 21.1 1.95
Czech Republic 21.2 20.4 20.7 2.03
Hungary 21.3 20.3 20.6 2.02
Italy 23.6 23.8 24.0 1.67
Spain 22.9 23.3 23.6 1.76
Netherlands 20.5 21.1 n.a. 1.85
Notes: n.a.=data not available. Source: Billari et al.
(2001); Council of Europe (2001)
cross-sectional analyses of European countries during the late 1990s.
4.3 Two Household and Union Formation Patterns among Lowest-Low
Fertility Countries?
In this section we extend our previous analyses and argue that lowest-low fertility countries
in the late 1990s are characterized by two distinct patterns of union formation that are
closely related to their historical precursors and historical patterns of family organization.
In Table 1 we begin with the cohort perspective and report the median age at leaving
home, the median age at ﬁrst union, the median age at ﬁrst marriage, and the completed
fertility (CTFR) of the 1960 cohort (or of 5 year cohorts centered on 1960) for selected
lowest-low fertility countries and the Netherlands. On the one hand, the table reveals
that Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary share a relatively early age at leaving
home, a relatively early age at union formation, and a relatively high completed fertility
level (CTFR) with the Netherlands, which is a forerunner of the Second Demographic
Transition. On the other hand, Italy and Spain are characterized by a late age at leaving
home, a late age at ﬁrst union and a low level of completed cohort fertility. Among lowest-
low fertility countries in Table 1, there is hence a clear negative relationship between the
timing of household and union formation and the quantum of fertility on the cohort level.7
In Table 2 we shift from a cohort to period perspective and investigate the patterns of
the marriage, divorce and fertility in 1999. Once a period pattern is adopted, the picture
becomes slightly more heterogeneous as compared to the above cohort analyses. Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, and Hungary exhibit a total ﬁrst marriage rate (TFMR) around 0.5
(with the lowest level of 0.46 in Hungary), while Italy and Spain have somewhat higher
TFMR close to 0.6. In the Netherlands, marriage still has an important role with a
7One needs to keep in mind, however, that the 1960 cohort in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and
Hungary basically completed union formation, ﬁrst-birth childbearing and in part also fertility at higher
parities during the socialist periods in prior to the transition beginning in 1990, and union formation
and childbearing patterns of younger cohorts who enter young adulthood after 1990 may be substantially
diﬀerent.19
Table 2: Total ﬁrst marriage rate (TFMR), total divorce rate (TDR), proportion of extra-
marital births and total fertility rate (TFR)in the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Italy, Spain, and The Netherlands in 1999
TFMR TDR % Extra- TFR
marital
births
Bulgaria 0.53 0.19 35.1 1.23
Czech Republic 0.48 0.32 20.6 1.13
Hungary 0.46 0.39 28.0 1.29
Italy 0.62 0.08 9.2 1.23
Spain 0.61 0.15 16.3 1.20
The Netherlands 0.60 0.37 22.7 1.65
Notes: TDR of Spain is 1995. Source: Council of Europe
(2001)
TFMR of 0.6 that is comparable to Italy and Spain, despite the fact that this country has
been a forerunner of the Second Demographic Transition (the Netherlands diﬀers in this
respect from some Nordic countries, such as Sweden, that have total ﬁrst marriage rates
of .46). A similar clustering of lowest-low fertility countries occurs also with respect to
the total divorce rate (TDR) in 1999. Italy has the lowest TDR of 0.08, followed by Spain
with a level of 0.15. All Central and Eastern European countries in Table 2 have higher
total divorce rates (Bulgaria 0.19, the Czech Republic 0.32, Hungary 0.39), which are
comparable or even higher than that in the Netherlands (0.37). A similarly heterogeneous
pattern characterizes also the prevalence of extra-marital births in the lowest-low fertility
countries in Table 2. Italy has a particularly low share of extramarital births (9.2%) and
is followed by Spain (16.3%), while Bulgaria (35.1%), the Czech Republic (20.6%) and
Hungary (28.0%) exhibit a proportion of extramarital births that is comparable or even
higher an that in the Netherlands (22.7) (for comparison, the proportion of extra-marital
births in Sweden is 55.3% in 1999).
In summary, the above analyses further strengthen our argument that the aggregate
cross-country relationship between partnership formation/dissolution and levels of fertil-
ity has become quite indeterminate in the late 1990s, which is strikingly diﬀerent from
the strong relations between fertility and union formation and dissolution that prevailed
20 years earlier. In addition, our analyses reveal important diﬀerences in home-leaving,
union formation and dissolution between lowest-low fertility countries. On the one hand,
the Southern European pattern is characterized by late separation from the parental house-
hold, a low prevalence of cohabitation and extra-marital fertility, and a high centrality of
marriage with long-term commitments and low rates of divorce. On the other hand, the
Central and Eastern European pattern is more diverse and characterized earlier home-
leaving, lower rates of marriage and higher rates of divorce and extra-marital fertility
than the Southern European pattern.20
5 Fertility-related Patterns of Female Labor Market Partic-
ipation
In addition to witnessing a changing relation between fertility and marriage or divorce, the
1990s have also challenged the conventional wisdom about the relation between aggregate-
level TFR and female labor force participation rates (FLFPR). In particular, conventional
economic theory predicts that increases in the wage rate of women lead to increases of
female labor market participation on the one, and decreases of fertility on the other side
due to increased opportunity costs of children in combination with a low income elasticity
of the number of children (Becker 1981; Cigno 1991; Willis 1973). At the macro level, this
relation has been translated into the hypothesis that the total fertility rate and the female
labor force participation rate should be inversely related in cross-country studies.
In this section we investigate the empirical evidence for this hypothesis as part of our
overall attempt in this paper to portrait the socioeconomic context of lowest-low fertility
trends. In particular, several recent studies have documented a changing cross-country
relationship between fertility levels and rates of female labor force participation. For
instance, Ahn and Mira (2002), Engelhardt et al. (2001) and K¨ ogel (2001) have shown
that the cross-country correlation between the total fertility rate and the FLFPR has
changed its sign in OECD countries during the mid 1980s and early 1990s. This ﬁnding is
also conﬁrmed in regression-based analyses (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; Esping-Andersen
1999), where female labor force participation rates are have a positive (and signiﬁcant)
inﬂuence on the TFR in cross-sectional analyses of OECD countries in the 1990s, while
comparable analyses for the 1970s reveal a negative inﬂuence.
This reversal of the relation between is depicted in Figure 9 that plots the 1975 and
1996 TFR levels against the corresponding female labor force participation rates (we focus
in Figure 9 on in Western Europe, where female labor force participation has traditionally
been very diﬀerent between countries; Central and Eastern European countries had a very
high female labor force participation prior to 1990, while female labor force participation
has been diﬃcult to assess during the transition process due to a widespread shadow
economy and incomplete employment registration).8 In 1975, countries with a high
FLFPR, such as Sweden or Denmark, exhibited low fertility in a European comparison,
while countries with low FLFPR, such as Italy or Spain, had relatively high fertility. In
1996, high FLFPR is associated with high fertility, such as in Denmark and Sweden,
while lowest-low fertility countries such as Italy and Spain are characterized by only quite
modest participation of females in the labor market. It is also important to note that
changes fertility levels—rather than changes in female labor force participation rates—
have been more prevalent in the countries in Figure 9, and the relative country-positions
with respect to female labor force participation have been remarkably constant during the
period 1975–96 (e.g., see the labeled points in the ﬁgure).
The above ﬁndings about the changing association between TFR levels and female
labor force participation has spurred several additional analyses that investigate this is-
sue further. Ahn and Mira (2002), for instance, emphasize the relevance of Mediterranean
8We are also grateful to Tomas K¨ ogel who has provided us with the data for these analyses.21
Figure 9: Female labor force participation rate and TFR, 1975 and 1996
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Note: TDR for Spain is for 1995. The ‘£’ mark gives the exact position of a country,
while the area of circle is proportional to the country’s population size in 1990. Source for
data: K¨ ogel (2001)
countries in the above pattern because the emergence of lowest-low fertility is an important
factor contributing to the reversal of the correlation. Brewster and Rindfuss (2000) also
emphasize the role of institutional arrangements, e.g., diﬀerent family policies, child-care
systems or welfare state typologies, and they stress the altered social norms regarding the
combination between childrearing and labor market participation of women. Speciﬁcally,
lowest-low fertility in Southern Europe has occurred in a context with very low compat-
ibility of fertility and female labor market participation, which is due to the diﬃculties
in entering and re-entering the labor market and the limited ﬂexibility of working hours
(Bettio and Villa 1998).
Obviously, the above studies cannot make inferences about causality due to their re-
liance on relatively simple aggregate data and analyses. One attempt to overcome this
limitation is conducted by Engelhardt et al. (2001) who study macro-level time-series data
for France, West Germany, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The study shows that macro-level causality—or speciﬁcally, Granger causality (e.g., see
Granger 1969; Hamilton 1994)—occurs in both directions, that is, from female labor force
participation to fertility, and vice-versa. In addition, the study supports the above cross-
sectional evidence in Figure 9 and ﬁnds that the negative association between the TFR
and the female labor force participation rate has become weaker over time for each indi-22
vidual country towards the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, and for selected
countries it has even reversed. An exception is Italy, where the negative association over
time between the TFR and FLFPR has not weakened at all. These conclusions, however,
are partially challenged by K¨ ogel (2001), who ﬁnds that there has not been a change
in sign of the association between TFR and FLFPR over time if analyses account for
country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Nevertheless, even after controlling for country-speciﬁc ef-
fects, K¨ ogel’s analyses conclude that the negative association between fertility and FLFPR
has weakened over time, and the analyses also emphasize that the fertility decline in the
Mediterranean countries has been an important factor contributing to the shifting relation
in Figure 9.
6 Concluding Discussion: Divergent Fertility Patterns in a
Comparative Perspective
In the previous sections we have argued that the emergence of lowest-low fertility marks
a discontinuity with past trends that widens the heterogeneity among European countries
with respect to fertility levels. In addition, we have demonstrated that several well-known
cross-country relationships between fertility and marriage, divorce and female labor force
participation need to be questioned and reconsidered in light of the most recent trends.
In this concluding discussion we utilize the above insights in order to evaluate whether
developed countries, and in particular European countries, converge with respect to their
fertility and fertility-related behavioral patterns, or alternatively, whether the countries
will be characterized by persistent diversity. The relevance of convergence has recently
been stressed in the context of the demographic transition from high to low fertility (Wil-
son 2001), and a similar reasoning suggests that it is of equal or even greater importance for
understanding fertility trends and life-course patterns in contexts with below-replacement
fertility. For instance, Mayer (2001) observes that long-standing diﬀerences in social and
economic institutions between Western European countries play a decisive role in deter-
mining the impacts of economic globalization on life course patterns, and he suggests that
at least four ‘ideal types’ of society can be identiﬁed within Western Europe and North
America: the Scandinavian social democratic welfare states (e.g., Sweden); the continental
conservative welfare states (e.g., Germany); the Southern European welfare states (e.g.,
Italy), and the liberal market states (e.g., UK, USA) (see also Esping-Andersen 1999).
These diﬀerent and often rigid institutional arrangements aﬀect—as one would expect on
the basis of conscious and rational life-course decision-making—the timing and sequence
of key life-course events, such as marriage or births, and institutional diﬀerences thus
partially explain the diﬀerent life courses chosen by individuals in the various developed
countries.
In addition to these institutional factors, Reher (1998) emphasizes enduring diﬀerences
in family systems. In particular, he contrasts family patterns in Southern Europe, which
are predominantly characterized by ‘strong’ ties (Granovetter 1973, 1985), with the family
ties in North-Western Europe, where ‘weak ties’ have been typical of family relations
for several centuries. Reher stresses in this context that these diﬀerent types of family23
ties exert a signiﬁcant impact on current life-course patterns in early adulthood, and he
concludes that the “divergent practices [of contemporary life-course transitions] appear to
have deep historical roots” (p. 205). The arguments of Mayer (2001) and Reher (1998)
can thus be seen as identifying two separate forces. Mayer’s line of argument emphasizes
the path-dependence of institutions, while Reher’s work stresses the initial conditions of
family organization that underly the evolution family and marriage patterns in modern
European societies.
In contrast to the above studies focusing on the determinants of persistent diﬀerences
in fertility and fertility-related behaviors between countries, other scholars have empha-
sized long-term convergence. Watkins (1990), for instance, studies the fertility transition
in Western Europe during the period 1870–1960 and argues that regional diversity within
countries diminish, which is in part due to an increasing inﬂuences of national instead of
local channels of social interactions (e.g., through national media). A further argument
suggesting convergence between countries is often derived from the Second Demographic
Transition theory (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; van de Kaa 1987), which argues that
demographic behavior in developed countries becomes increasingly less constrained by so-
cietal norms and is instead more strongly based on individual considerations of the costs
and beneﬁts of alternative types of family life. The theory also proposes that demographic
change is closely linked to ideational sifts towards more postmodern, individualistic and
post-materialistic value orientations, and as a consequence, family forms and fertility be-
havior are becoming increasingly diverse within cohorts.
Although the notion of convergence is not explicitly expressed in the initial formulations
of the Second Demographic Transition theory, the Netherlands and Nordic countries were
often portrayed as forerunners of demographic changes gradually leading to more diverse
life-courses in all contemporary European countries. In particular, the theory envisions
that over time all European countries become characterized by low fertility and a high
prevalence of new behavioral patterns such as delayed union formation after leaving the
parental home, cohabitation, out-of-wedlock childbearing, and divorce.
In order to investigate the above notion of convergence, Billari and Wilson (2001) have
conducted an analysis of early life-course transition, such as leaving home, ﬁrst union, ﬁrst
marriage and ﬁrst birth, in nine Western European countries. The analyses are based on
the Fertility and Family Surveys that have been conducted in many European countries
during the 1990s (e.g., see Klijzing and Corijn 2002), and they compare the experience
of ﬁve-year birth cohorts born from 1946–50 to 1961–65. An important result of these
analyses is that there is no strong indication for convergence with respect to many fertility
and fertility-related behaviors; quite on the contrary, there has been remarkably little
convergence with respect to important life-course patterns such as the sequencing of ﬁrst
birth and ﬁrst marriage or the prevalence of cohabitation in early adulthood. Figure
10(a), for instance, depicts the share of women starting the ﬁrst union before marriage.
Not surprisingly, Sweden is at the forefront of the diﬀusion of non-marital ﬁrst unions:
cohabitation prior to marriage was already widespread for the cohort 1946–50 and the
share of women having a non-marital ﬁrst union prior to marrying reaches almost 100%
in the most recent cohort (1961–65). At the other extreme of the diﬀusion of non-marital24
Figure 10: (a) Share of women starting a consensual union before ﬁrst marriage in se-
lected Western European countries; (b) share of women having a birth before
ﬁrst marriage in selected Western European countries
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ﬁrst unions are two Southern European countries with lowest-low fertility, Italy and Spain.
Albeit the share of women starting to cohabit in their ﬁrst union in these countries is rising
as well, the levels are still very low (11% in Italy and 14% in Spain for the 1961–65 cohort).
Between the extreme cases marked by Sweden on the one and Italy/Spain on the other
side, Figure 10(a) includes several other European countries with fertility levels above the
lowest-low threshold of a TFR of 1.3.
Figure 10(b) presents a further example for a diﬀerential sequencing across European
countries of important life-course events in young adulthood across, which supports the
above argument about limited convergence in life-course patterns. In particular, Figure
10(b) presents the share of women who give birth to a child before getting married and
it reveals that Sweden is again at the forefront of the diﬀusion of extra-marital fertility.
The cohort born 1946–50 in Sweden had already the highest share of women who give
birth prior to the ﬁrst marriage among all countries in Figure 10(b), and this level already
exceeds the level attained by all other countries for last cohort born 1961–65. This share
has further increased in Sweden over time, and it attains a level of 61% in the most
recent cohort. The other extreme of the pattern is represented by the lowest-low fertility
counties Italy and Spain, along with Portugal and Belgium, that all exhibit proportions of
ﬁrst births prior to ﬁrst marriage below 8%. In addition, the country ranking is relatively
stable across cohorts, and there have been no movements between the three clusters with
low, moderate and high levels of ﬁrst births before marriage.
In summary, the patterns of lowest-low fertility portrayed in this paper allow us to draw
ﬁrst conclusions about the determinants and macro-level covariates of low and lowest-low
fertility in contemporary Europe. First, our portrait of contemporary European fertility
patterns identiﬁes a systematic pattern of lowest-low fertility that is characterized by a
rapid delay of childbearing, a low progression probability after the ﬁrst child (but not25
particularly low levels of ﬁrst-birth childbearing), a “falling behind” in cohort fertility
at relatively late ages (in Southern Europe) and a reversal in the relative ranking of
lowest-low fertility countries in a European comparison of TFR levels. At the end of the
1990s, therefore, there emerges a clear clustering of European nations separating them
into countries with moderately high fertility levels and countries with lowest-low fertility,
and this clustering is mirrored in many fertility-related behaviors such as female labor
force participation, the diﬀusion of cohabitation or out-of-wedlock childbearing and other
dimensions.
Second, lowest-low fertility countries are themselves heterogeneous and cluster into
two distinct patterns. On the one hand, Southern European lowest-low fertility coun-
tries, including foremost Italy and Spain, exhibit also latest-late home-leaving behavior, a
limited spread of non-marital cohabitation, a low share of extramarital births, a limited
diﬀusion of divorce, and a relatively low share of women participating in the labor force.
They also exhibit a more marked postponement of ﬁrst births and a lower recuperation
of fertility at higher ages. On the other hand, Central and Eastern European countries,
represented in our analyses by Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Hungary, exhibit relatively
earlier household independence, union formation. They also they have higher non-marital
fertility and divorce rates, and ﬁrst births take place earlier than in Southern European
lowest-low fertility countries.
Third, many behavioral patterns characteristic for lowest-low fertility countries have
been subject to remarkably little convergence, and our analyses suggest that many of
the above characteristics of lowest-low fertility countries, and their diﬀerences with other
European or developed countries, are subject to path-dependent evolution and are thus
likely to persist in the near- and medium-term future.
Fourth, the emergence of lowest-low fertility during the 1990s has been accompanied
by a disruption or even a reversal of many well-known patterns that have been used to
explain cross-country diﬀerences in fertility patterns. For instance, the cross-sectional
correlations European countries between the total fertility level on the one side, and the
total ﬁrst marriage rate, the proportion of extramarital births and the female labor force
participation rate on the other side have reversed during the period from 1975 to 1999. At
the end of the 1990s there is also no longer evidence that divorce levels are negatively as-
sociated with fertility levels. Hence, there are crucial changes in the relationship between
traditional determinants of fertility—such as marriage, divorce, home-leaving and female
labor force participation—and fertility before and after the emergence of lowest-low fer-
tility, and perhaps most importantly, there is a clear indication that a high prevalence of
marriage and institutionalized long-term partnership commitments are no longer associ-
ated with higher fertility in cross-sectional comparisons. While the detailed analysis of the
determinants of this reversal is beyond the scope of the present paper, one fundamental
cause can probably not be disputed: The reversal in cross-sectional associations between
fertility and related behaviors is in part due to the diﬀerent demographic factors driving
fertility change. Initially, the decline towards low fertility has been importantly related to
stopping behavior, that is, a reduction of higher parity births. More recently, the post-
ponement of fertility—particularly for ﬁrst births—has emerged as a crucial determinant26
of diﬀerences in fertility levels among developed countries.
Concluding this paper, we also emphasize an important caveat of our descriptive anal-
yses that do not necessarily identify causal relations; causal patterns are almost impossible
to disentangle with the aggregate-level data used in these introductory investigations. The
patterns we have described may either be part of a complex web of causation where fertility
and fertility-related factors inﬂuence each other, or they may just be the indication that
other general factors are simultaneously driving changes in fertility and fertility-related
behaviors.
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